Hizb-ut-Tahrir Strategy and the Caliphate Conference in Indonesia

By: NOMAN HANIF
Published: August 15, 2007


On the 12th of August, 2007, the transnational Islamic movement, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), staged in Jakarta, Indonesia, what is undeniably the largest conference ever held on the subject of 'reviving the Caliphate'. The conference was the biggest in a series of events organised on the same subject in many different international locations. An estimated 80,000 people attended the event at the HGelora Bung Karno Stadium, with invited speakers from HT around the world, as well as Indonesian personalities such as television icon Abdullah Gymnastier, former Muhammadiya head, Prof. Amin Rais, Ma'ruf Hussein from Nahdlatul Ulama, including its board chairman, Din Syamsuddin, current leader of Muhammadiyah, Habib Riziq Shihab, General Chairman of the Islam Defending Front, FPI and Zainuddin MZ (Reform Star Party, PBR). On the day however two of the HT speakers, Imran Wahid from the UK and Sheikh Ismail Al Wahwah from Australia were banned entry into Indonesia. Whilst other speakers such as Abu Bakr Bashir, leader of Gemaa Islamiya, who was cleared of the Bali bombings by the Indonesian courts was according to some media reports requested to stay away by the police, citing security concerns. Hence, most of the speakers for varying reasons were unable to attend.

However, despite the inevitable euphoria created by HT, searching questions have arisen as regards the political circumstances surrounding the Indonesian Caliphate conference and the strategy of HT. This is because despite the big bang approach, HT is still a newcomer onto the Indonesian public scene yet on paper represents a clear and present danger to the stability of the Indonesian regime and Western security in the region. Despite this it seems that HT has been given the green light by the Indonesian government, the armed forces, the government sponsored Council of Ulema, co-opted by the Indonesian Islamic movements and allowed free reign without Western pressure. This article endeavours to understand some of the reasons for this perplexing political landscape by situating the conference within the context of contemporary HT strategy.

No Longer Arabian Knights

The conference in Indonesia forms part of a continuum of change in strategy by HT away from the Arab world. This is despite the fact that according to its literature, the Arab world forms the priority location for the establishment of the Caliphate. This position was firmly adhered to under its founder Sheikh Taqiudine-an-Nabhani until his death in 1977. According to Nabhani, the Arab countries were natural and necessary support points because of the historical strength of Islam in the region, the linguistic qualities of the Arabic language (it being the language of Islam and the Koran) and what he defined as the leadership characteristics inherent in the nature of the Arab people. Nabhani recognised the need for some activity outside of the Arab zone, but only from the point of expansion, not establishment. With Jordan as the hub, extensive work was targeted in Syria, Iraq and Egypt amongst others. Military coups were attempted in these countries during the 60's and 70's. Nabhani demonstrated no interest in establishing a presence in the Western world despite the presence of HT members in the West as students and asylum seekers. This position seems to have undergone a radical change under the leadership of his successor Abdul Qadeem Zaloom, who rode the wave of Islamic political revival instigated by the events of Iran in 1979. Under Zaloom, HT unsuccessfully approached Khomeini for support to transform the Iranian sentiment into a Caliphate. Bearing in mind the Iranian Shia doctrine, its Safavid history of hostility towards the Sunni world and its underlying Persian pride, the rejection by Khomeini would have been inevitable. The trend under Zaloom to focus away from the Arab world continued with success and expansion in Central Asia as a result of a vacuum following the collapse of the Soviet Union and with further moves into Pakistan and Bangladesh. The HT presence in the West evolved rapidly with branches in the UK, Australia, Germany, Holland, Russia and Denmark. The UK's co-option of HT for its own policy aims allowed it to develop a base for its global media. Indonesia, being the largest Muslim populated country was naturally warm to HT as an Islamist movement because of its unique history of having responded to the expansion of the historical Islamic Caliphate in allowing conquest through invitation. Yet despite this geographical expansion by HT, the Arab world remains elusive to it with its presence and influence in the core countries of the Middle East next to negligible. With no effort being afforded to focus on the Arab world and instead a monumental push the spotlight onto outside regions, the question arises as to whether there has been an unwritten strategy which has moved away from what was adopted by Nabhani. Indonesia represents the ideal model to evaluate this point. HT in Indonesia does not suffer the hallmarks of repression as in the case of Central Asia and thus inevitably provides a more fertile environment for its activity. Also as the case of Iran and the consistent calls for support amongst the armed forces in Pakistan and elsewhere demonstrate, the seeking of power in the absence of a party presence or leadership of society does not seem to be an obstacle for HT in the post-Nabhani era.


Bandwagoning to Power

In fact the post-Nabhani leadership has moved away from the dogmatic exclusivity of approach and instead embraced a co-operative process in the form of bandwagoning on the influence of other movements. The pre-occupation with the media and with continuous conferences and demonstrations outside of the Arab zone despite its lack of presence in society is indicative of a failure to build a popular base in the Arab countries and a leadership for its movement. Despite HT's failure in what it terms as the stage of interaction within which the leadership for its thoughts and movements is required as a pre-requisite to seizing power, no attempt has been made to scale back its position. Instead, its members insist that it remains in the process of seeking 'nusrah'(support for power) and that the general sentiments of the 'ummah' (Islamic nation) for Islam are sufficient to seize power. By adopting these vague criteria for mass leadership, HT has effectively abandoned the interactive stage of its methodology through which it envisioned exclusive leadership for the thoughts and the movement. In order to bypass building the popular base, HT has been forced to co-opt popular movements for legitimacy and through media spin promote the term of the Caliphate as a populist concern. The Indonesian Conference forms a perfect example to illustrate this point. Unlike in Central Asia, HT does not command a dominant following in Indonesia. The likely pull for the 80,000 or so attendance in Jakarta would have been from the ingrained organisations such as the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiya which alone claim to command more than 30-40 million members. HT has attempted to bandwagon on the backs of these movements based on the least common denominator, the agreement on the term 'Caliphate'. However, beyond concurrence on the term, HT has very little in common with these movements and individuals. This again is a radical shift away from Nabhani who in his book 'The Islamic State' had warned against abandoning the hard graft work of building a real popular base built on deeply held convictions instead of attempting to build an artificial movement towards the Caliphate through conferences etc. For Nabhani the popularisation of terminology and even of HT as an organisation meant nothing without a deeply held conviction in Islam as a political ideology dominant within society. Contemporary members of HT argue as they usually do, that the conference is a means and a style to advance the interaction of its ideas with the population. On this point Nabhani was categoric in his warning towards the dangers of using certain means and styles. Nabhani considered that unless HT was in the last push to seize power, large rallies and conferences would be counter-productive as they would simply release the frustration and anger of the masses, the cumulative effect being the loss in motivation, morale, confidence and even belief in the return of the Caliphate.

"...It therefore follows that holding conferences on the issue of the Khilafah would not of itself lead to the establishment of the Islamic State, nor would a federation of countries ruling Muslim peoples be a legitimate method to establish the Islamic State, nor would congresses of Muslim peoples help in the resumption of the Islamic way of life. None of these, nor anything similar to them, should be considered correct, instead they would merely represent rhetoric aimed at soothing the anger of the Muslims..." (Nabhani, Islamic State, p97)

One of the few times Nabhani did authorise a mass rally was in the 60's in order to ascertain the strength and support of the Party in Jordan for the purposes of evaluating a move into the stage of interaction with society. Hence in the context of the conference in Indonesia, having bandwagoned on the big movements to pull in the crowds, a distorted picture would have emerged as regards understanding the strength of HT in Indonesia, but more importantly in raising the spectre of a Caliphate in such a manner, it has attempted to promote a strength of societal leadership which in turn has raised the expectations not only amongst the masses, but also its membership. Unless, HT is planning something spectacular, how it perceives delivering on its promises through a contemporary strategy of media spin, conferences and band-wagoning on movements with whom it shares no ideological or political affiliation is open to question.


Sleeping with the Enemy

In this regard, it was clear that HT in the context of Indonesia was not concerned whether or not ideological and/or political convergence existed. A good example of this was the inclusion on its website of a statement by an Indonesian government minister promoting the conference upon a non-contextualised position of unity. Thus, in order to gain the support of the crowd and the invited movements and individuals, the emphasis of the speeches in the conferences was an attempt to provide confidence in the Caliphate as an institution. Interestingly, the basis of this confidence was promoted from the perspective of the Caliphate being a representative government, as well as an economic, social and political stabiliser. Why this is interesting is because it represents an attempt to market the Caliphate on a systemic level and not a doctrinal one which Nabhani regarded as the basis upon which the masses should connect and move for the Caliphate. In other words the Caliphate was being packaged on the acceptance that the Western model was lucrative to the masses and they may not necessarily respond to some of the comparative solutions to governance thrown up by HT's conception of the Islamic doctrine with that of the democratic model which HT rejects. This is reflective in its association with the Indonesian movements such as the Muhammadiya and the Nahdlatul Ulama which have a starkly different conception of Islamic governance to that of HT.

Both these movements have acted largely in concert with the Indonesian government for decades even acting as king makers in times of political crisis. This point is aptly demonstrated by the comments of the chairman of Muhammadiyah, who said that any implementation of a caliphate would have to conform to the state ideology of Pancasila, (the philosophy of the Indonesian state modelled on Buddhist conception of ethics), the principles of which are set forth in the preamble of the 1945 Indonesian constitution. The five principles enunciated by former President Sukarno and in the order given in the constitution are: belief in one supreme God; humanitarianism; nationalism expressed in the unity of Indonesia; consultative democracy; and social justice.

This concept of governance was put forward with the sizeable Hindu and animist sectors of the population in mind. Hence, the NU and Muhammadiya conceptualised Islamic governance within this framework. Thus according to Din Syamsuddin, invited Chairman of Muhamadiyya, "Khilafah shouldn't undermine the inclusivism and pluralism of the nation," (Christian Science Monitor 13th August 2007). He added that non-Muslims did not have to be afraid of the discourse on Khilafah as it was part of the democratic process. Furthermore, it was the Nahdlatul Ulama which was the first major organisation to formally make the Pancasila instead of Islam its sole foundation. The clause in the statutes stating that the NU was based on Islam was replaced by 'based on Pancasila'.

The point being that these two co-opted Indonesian movements did not perceive as antagonistic to Pancasila, the manner in which the Caliphate argument had been presented by HT. This is despite the fact that apart from the belief in one supreme God, HT ideology seems to be in direct conflict with all the other principles of Pancasila. Again, this strategy of HT is a rapid departure from that of Nabhani who maintained that in order to preserve the purity of the ideology, the clarity of its message and the political distinctiveness of HT, sharing of platforms with organisations which were deemed to espouse non-islamic concepts such as democracy, social justice and nationalism and/or were linked to governments were to be completely shunned.

In the post-Nabhani era, pragmatism has now become a hallmark of HT throughout its global branches, even extending to the extremes of sleeping with the enemy. This point is more ironic considering that Abdurrahman Wahid former head of NU who became Indonesian president was labelled by HT as a 'freemason' and an 'American agent'. The history of the Indonesian Islamic movements is testament to the fact that it is not their aim to undermine the status of the Indonesian state or its stability. This being the case, it begs the question as to what is the rationale for the NU and Muhammadiya in co-opting HT and allowing it mass exposure on its back.

Unification or Entrapment?

HT's pragmatism towards the movements in Indonesia who are relatively liberal Sin comparison, is similar to its stance in the UK. Just like in the UK, HT in Indonesia is exhibiting a conformist approach towards other movements in order to gain support and legitimacy. Here lies the problem for HT. HT's co-option by the Indonesian movements coincides with the policy brief put forward by the US Rand Corporation entitled 'Building Moderate Networks', which argues that the US has failed to move the Arab world away from radicalism and thus a strategy of mobilising moderate Islamic opinion from weaker countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia and even the Western world is the way to effect change in the Arab world. The paper argues that in order to achieve this, the US must co-opt the 'liberal', 'moderate' and 'modernist' movements such as the NU and Muhammadiya in order to prevent and fight Islamic radicalisation based on the model of the Cold War. There already exists a fluid relationship between the US and the Indonesian movements including the NU and Muhammadiya through US-Indonesia forums and democratisation projects sponsored by the US administration through the Asia foundation and Ford Foundation. In fact former Muhammadiya Chairman Ahmad Syafii Maarif and Muhammadiyah Youth Central Board Chairman Abdul Mu'ti were key contributors to the RAND policy report. The report outlines the hostility within the liberal sections of these movements to the concept of an Islamic state and promotes them as ideal candidates to further the democratic liberal agenda.


"Network-building efforts in Southeast Asia should incorporate NGO work with the moderate traditionalist Indonesian organization Nahdlatul Ulama, with its 15,000 affiliated pesantren, and with the modernist organization Muhammadiyah and its network of higher education and social welfare institutions. Both Islamist and liberal sectors coexist in Muhammadiyah: Islamist elements can be found in the organization's Religious Council, which is charged with da'wa, while liberals have a home in the Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy, established to promote a liberal agenda within and outside the organization." (Building Moderate Networks, RAND, p139)


This would put HT in direct confrontation not only with US policy but also with the strategy of the NU and Muhammadiya. HT may have bandwagoned on the support base of these movements but beyond the rhetoric of the term 'Khilafah' there exists very little in common. In fact HT fits quite neatly into the pluralist framework developed by the NU and Muhammadiya. If any lessons can be learned from the relationship of the UK government with HT's new strategy of co-option, it is that HT can be manoeuvred to moderate its position and even serve policy goals. (The Future of HT in Britain, icssa.org). It could be argued that HT's inclusion into the pluralistic framework would serve as an entrapment mechanism which would seek to moderate and degrade HT's radicalism. This point is strengthened by the fact that neither the Indonesian nor US governments have intervened or put obstacles in the way of this approach between HT and the movements. This paints a complex picture and a perplexity as to the nature of the relationship between HT, these movements and US policy in the region. Bearing in mind the established position of these movements with US strategy and the Indonesian government, the question is whether HT as a result of its new pragmatism has walked into a US political trap with the acquiescence of the Indonesian government, NU and Muhammadiya.

The Theory of the Phantom Caliphate

There is no doubt that the idea of the Caliphate is becoming a worldwide phenomenon. On paper, HT's call for a Caliphate is the most dangerous one for the current regimes and Western security in the Islamic world. The manner in which HT have constructed the ideology of the Caliphate clearly demonstrates a brutal position towards Western civilisation and its adherents. For this reason US think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation have labelled HT in Central Asia as the "greatest threat to US interests". Bearing this characterisation in mind why would the US and the Indonesian government have allowed the Caliphate conference to have gone ahead in Indonesia. Due to its location, the US has maintained a strong strategic relationship with Indonesia.

The stability of the Indonesian government is of paramount concern for the US and for Australia. For this reason, the US is a major supplier of military hardware to Indonesia as well as the Indonesian army's biggest training provider through the IMET exchange scheme. The US has been engaged with successive Indonesian regimes, maintaining stability and influence through the loyalty of the armed forces. Hence it is ironic that despite the objective of HT to replace regimes in the Islamic world with a Caliphate, no pressure was exerted by the US or the Indonesian military/government to ban the conference. There was no bigger advertisement for the Caliphate and HT than the conference in Indonesia.

Bearing in mind the RAND reports suggestion of US failure to derail political Islam in the Arab world and with the ever critical threat of regime collapse, the theory of the Western powers being forced to install a pliant Phantom Caliphate in order to suck the life out of the Caliphate movement has some resonance and may even explain the events in Indonesia. It is in this regard that the allowance of a major Caliphate Conference by the UK in 1994 and now by the Indonesian government with the acquiescence of the US is suggestive of a possible plan to utilise HT's successful marketing of the 'Caliphate'. This suggestion may seem extremely fanciful and conspiratorial at first, but it does have precedent.

The exact idea was in fact toyed with by Britain in the last stages of the Ottoman Caliphate and detailed in what is known as the MacMohan-Hussein correspondence of that period. The strategy was based on the notion that the Islamic world considered the Caliphate as the only legal form of Islamic government and hence in order to absorb the aftershocks of the breaking up the Ottoman state, an Arab Caliphate pliant to British interests would be established under Sherif Hussein of Mecca. The idea was abandoned because maintaining the idea of a Caliphate was considered too dangerous. The theory of a phantom Caliphate is actually quite well recognised amongst the members of HT. In fact according to internal sources the US may have contemplated using the position of HT in Central Asia to bring about a Caliphate in order to cause enormous problems for Russia and China. However, the members insist that the US shelved this plan because of fears that the Caliphate may ignite an uncontrollable fire in the Islamic tinderbox surrounding Central Asia. What is interesting in this theory is that the members consider HT as being the only group which the US can use to bring about this scenario.

If one was to follow this logic then the hands off approach by the US and the Indonesian authorities towards HT's expansion in Indonesia is indeed a cause for contemplation as is the allowance of HT by the NU and Muhammadiya to bandwagon despite major contradictions between them. Indonesia would no doubt be an attractive location geographically to establish a Phantom Caliphate as it is far away from the crucible of the Islamic world in the Middle East and Central Asia. The idea of leadership over the rest of the Islamic world, especially the Arab world would be another issue of contention. The idea of staging a temporary Phantom caliphate and its fomenting a quick collapse would no doubt cause a major haemorrhage in the Islamic world and set back the movement for the Caliphate for decades.

Whatever the theory of a phantom Caliphate, what is certain is that HT has laid down the gauntlet and raised exponentially the hopes of the faithful regarding the immediacy of the Caliphate's return. The common rhetoric espoused by the speakers of the various HT conferences was the notion that the Islamic world was on the brink of the Caliphate. No doubt injecting motivation and confidence into its own membership to keep on board would have been a key determinant. Indeed, if the Caliphate Conference in Indonesia and the multiple other rallies in different parts of the world were intended as a final push before seizing power then this view may hold. In its absence, HT is walking a fine line with its rhetoric, on the basis of a failure to deliver and more fundamentally by seeking power in the absence of a popular base.

In conclusion, having withdrawn effectively from the key countries of the Arab world, HT has not availed its dominant situation in Central Asia. If power is being sought outside of the Arab world then Central Asia is strategically better located to the rest of the Islamic world than Indonesia. Instead Central Asia remains irrationally suspended in a mindless political struggle producing intolerable suffering for its members as a result of the brutality of the regimes. What exactly are HT objectives for Indonesia is unclear. The conference was no doubt a very loud political statement, but to whom?

There is no unified opinion amongst the membership as to the reasons for the multiple conferences. One predominant view is that it provides confidence to the 'ummah' and acts as a catalyst for the Arab world. This argument is somewhat infertile considering the fact that no popular base exists for HT in the Arab world and that the heat of large conferences are only temporary and are connected more to the location within which they are staged. Another point against this argument is that HT's media activity is obsessed not with the Arab world but a new strategy encompassing non-Arab territories. Whether this is in actuality a clever political ploy to divert Western attention away from the Arab world or it is evidence of desperation remains to be seen.

Noman Hanif is lecturer in radical Islam and International terrorism at Birkbeck, University of London. He is currently researching the Global Politics of Hizb-ut-Tahrir

Pakistan’s Tableeghi Jamaat and Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Central Asia

By: NOMAN HANIF
Published: July 24, 2007



According to a report in Eurasianet on 23rd July 2007, the Pakistan based Islamic movement, Tableeghi Jamaat has been the one of the most active entities proselytizing in Central Asia, especially in Kyrgyzstan. Shamsibek Zakirov, an advisor of the head of the State Agency for Religious Affairs under the Kyrgyz Government stated that "it is not a secret that Islamic radicals from Pakistan are actively working among the Muslims in Central Asia, especially in Kyrgyzstan. The Tablighi Jamaat is the most active organization of all foreign Islamic missionaries."(Eurasianet.org)

The unhindered growth of the movement in Central Asia bearing in mind the nature and position of the Tableegh vis-vis Pakistan raises some interesting questions as to the underlying reason of its presence in Central Asia. Traditionally, the landscape of Central Asia’s post Soviet space has been dominated by two movements, primarily that of the global Islamic movement, Hizb ut Tahrir or Liberation Party and to a lesser degree that of the IMU or Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Out of the two HT commands a greater ideological presence and influence throughout the region. Due to its political nature and the call to replace the ex-Communist regimes with an Islamic system and a Caliphate, HT has been banned by all the countries of Central Asia. It has been described as the greatest threat to US interests in the region by center right and right wing think tanks in America.

The threat of HT continues to shadow US policy towards the Caspian oil region and the energy corridor between Central Asia and Pakistan. The number of HT membership in the region has been estimated to run into many thousands with many filling the prisons of Central Asian states for being mere members. There are three contributing factors to HT’s success in the region, firstly the nature of its ideology which constructs classical Islam as a modern intellectual paradigm and hence was naturally capable of filling the ideological vacuum left by Communism and responding to an ideologically based society.

Secondly, leaders like Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov manufactured a threat to the stability of Central Asia through HT in order to gain support and maintain favour with Russia, China and the West. Thirdly, the economic conditions, corruption and ineptitude of the regimes coupled with the brutality with which HT and political Islam in general was targeted generated the conditions for HT’s expansion. The situation at present is the failure of Russian, Western and Central Asian policy to halt the juggernaut of HT. It is within this context that the study of Tableeghi Jamaat must be situated.

The Tableeghi Jamaat or Islamic Missionary Movement was started in the 1920’s by Maulana Iliyas with the aim of changing society through applying a model of individual spiritual and moral change based on the Prophet Mohammed and his disciples. Due to its position of eschewing politics and refraining from criticising governments the movement has been tolerated and even welcomed in many Islamic countries as a counter-balance to radical Islam. The missionary nature of its work has even afforded it a reception in Israel. The tableegh now centres’ itself largely in Pakistan where its headquarters are to be found in former Pakistani Prime Nawaz Sharif’s home town of Raiwind near Lahore in the Punjab.

However, despite its apolitical nature, the reality of the Islamic movement in Pakistan is that it is heavily infiltrated and influenced by the state and especially the Pakistani intelligence agency the ISI. One of the biggest gatherings in the world from amongst the Islamic movements is held annually by the TJ in Raiwind. Amongst its followers are many from the armed forces, political elites and the intelligence services. Because it espouses no desire to engage politically, regimes feel safe from the movement. Yet despite this the Pakistani intelligence and by default the US, fed heavily off the movement as regards recruitment for the Afghan and Kashmiri jihad during the 1980’s whilst it internally engaged to depoliticise the masses.

It was also through the Pakistani intelligence that the US policy towards Central Asia was active including the Caucuses in Chechnya. The covert support for the ISI backing of the Taliban along with its destabilising influence on Russia and China also fitted in with the US involvement in the Great Game in Central Asia. However, due to an understanding between the US and Russia in 1994 whereby Russia agreed support US action in the UN over Iraq if the US agreed not to interfere in Chechnya by supporting the Chechen fighters started a change in the architecture of US involvement in the region. Despite this, the conflictual dynamics of energy security, strategic presence and political Islam kept the US firmly engaged.

In the post Soviet space however, it was political Islam which provided the greatest threat to energy security and strategic presence in the region. Hence, with the excuse of 9/11, the US launched a diplomatic offensive in European capitals, Moscow and Beijing aimed at overtly justifying an alliance against a vague conception of a war on terror built on a commonly perceived threat of political Islam.

Covertly, the war on terror was a political trap to justify US military expansion in order to secure energy corridors and strategic positions. Hence Craig Murray, former UK ambassador to Uzbekistan questioned the need for US bases in Central Asia as well as the strategic positioning of its military bases in Afghanistan which he claimed logistically had nothing to do with the Pak-Afghan border and the War on Terror and judging by the positioning of the bases more to do with the encirclement of Central Asia. (craigmurray.com)

The Pakistani involvement in Chechnya was confirmed by General Parvez Musharraf whose first priority upon receiving the green light from Washington to seize power was to dismantle the Pakistani link with the Chechen cause. The aim was to remove the threat of radical Islam from the theatre of Central Asian politics. Initially, Russia had turned a blind eye to Saudi Arabia’s insertion of Wahabist’s into the Chechen cauldron as the Sufi doctrine of the Chechen’s would inevitably collide with the anti-sufist Wahabist’s with the hope of igniting a civil war amongst the Chechen’s. However, the Wahabist inclination toward’s jihad undermined this strategy. The war on terror also enabled Musharraf to allow the US to remove the Taliban which was being used indirectly by the US to foment Islamic radicalism in Central Asia. The nexus which had once been fostered by the US and Pakistan between Central Asia and Pakistan threatened to unify a movement from Central Asia to Northern Pakistan. This nexus had to be broken, hence the crackdown by Musharraf on Central Asians studying in the madrassas of Pakistan and the agreement with the Northern tribals to co-operate on the basis that foreigners including Central Asian’s were removed. Furthermore, intelligence reports suggested that the pro-government elements of the Taliban had started to breakaway from the Central Asian elements causing fissures within the Taliban itself.(Jamestown.org)

Thus the insertion of the Tableeghi Jamaat into Central Asia has to be seen in the context of a US policy aided by the Pakistani regime in combating radical/political Islam in Central Asia and more specifically the threat of HT. Although the arrival of the TJ in Central Asia was in 1991, its concentration on the Ferghana Valley considered the hub of radical activity amongst HT and the IMU gives a clear indication of its professed target. The hand of Pakistan and by default the US seems apparent. According to Igor Rotar;

“Virtually all of the Tablighi members active in Central Asia are locals who have undergone training in either India or Pakistan” (Eurasia.net 23rd July, 2007)

It is this very Pakistani factor which has aroused suspicion amongst the Central Asian regimes as to the political reality of TJ in the region and the role of the US. Having failed to detach states such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan away from the Russian orbit and the involvement with Pakistan over the Taliban, suspicions of the US hand in TJ would be inevitable, especially since the training of its members is occurring in Pakistan. In contrast to HT in Kyrgystan whose membership derives more from the Uzbeks, TJ’s is more indigenously Kyrgyz. Yet despite its official sanction in contrast to HT, the Kyrgyz authorities remain suspicious of it. According to Igor Rotar

“While Zakirov admitted that all available evidence indicates that the Tablighi Jamaat continues to adhere to an apolitical stance, he nevertheless adopted a skeptical stance toward the group” (Eurasia.net, 23rd July, 2007)

For this reason Uzbekistan has formally banned the TJ and Kazakhstan frequently picks up their members for questioning. It is the likely the position of the US that Central Asian regimes especially those of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan can be persuaded to overcome the alternate Islamic deficit by heavily promoting TJ as an alternative to the threat posed by HT and changing their current policy towards it by arguing the interests of stability and security. However, a number of obstacles remain in it way. Firstly, the Central Asian regimes possess an ideological, economic, political and security credibility deficit amongst their populations which neutralises the apolitical idea of TJ. Secondly, HT provides a more superior and comprehensive understanding and vision of Islam and politics that TJ does not possess. This is something well understood by the US as its own think tanks such as the Nixon Center, Brookings Institute, Hudson Institute and the Heritage foundation have detailed the ideology of HT.

Hence the idea of the US promoting the TJ as an altruistic policy for Central Asian stability is not one shared especially by the Kyrgyz religious Affairs minister. Rather it seems the sentiment remains that through Pakistan and the TJ, the US is looking for another channel to open up influence in the Central Asian Islamic theatre. Thus says Zakirov;

“"Many Tablighi members are uneducated and very fanatical. I don’t think that importing the Pakistani version of Islam will promote the stabilization of Central Asia.”

Zakirov’s comments reflect the difference in understanding over HT and TJ. Firstly that HT commands a membership from all strata of society including from the academia and intelligentsia and secondly HT and its ideology is not considered indigenous and not linked to any foreign state. More succinctly it identifies a characteristic amongst the TJ which was utilised by the Pakistani ISI and the US in Afghanistan, Kashmir and even in the Balkan’s. The susceptibility to jihadism because of the “fanaticism” and “Pakistani version of Islam” is an emotional characteristic within the Pakistani psyche which the US through the Pakistani ISI have become adept at manipulating for policy goals. It is thus the wider political dynamic within which TJ has operated which is likely to be causing concerns for the Central Asian regimes.

In contrast HT does not follow a militaristic methodology to bring about change and hence has no history with jihadism or violence against the regimes but more pertinently the involvement of its members with state crafted policy. In essence this is the paradox of HT, radical but non-violent. Attempts by US think tanks to insinuate a link between HT and terrorism in order to frame it under the war on terror have conclusively failed.

The history and contemporary activity of TJ in Pakistan and its use by the intelligence services alludes to a potential whereby TJ members can and have been involved in recruiting for jihadism. Hence, the US through the double edged sword of the Pakistani TJ has the capacity to destabilise the Central Asian regimes. The potential nature of this threat to its own situation seems to be lurking in the back of the regimes minds in Central Asia.

According to Igor: “Although Tablighi members claim that they converse only about God, we are not certain that they are not agitating our youth to go to Iraq and Pakistan for battle,"(Eurasia.net)



Noman Hanif is lecturer in Radical Islam, International Terrorism and Energy Security at Birkbeck, University of London

Copyright © nomanhanif 2007

Hizb ut Tahrir Pakistan – The British Dimension

Noman Hanif

On the 5th of July, 2009, the British media indicated for the first time the extent to which British intelligence may have penetrated the local and Pakistani branch of the Islamic party Hizb ut Tahrir or Liberation Party including an insight as to why the UK political establishment may have resisted enormous pressure for its proscription. Nicola Smith’s article in the Sunday Times entitled ‘British Islamists Plot against Pakistan’ suggested that British members of HT had been operating throughout Pakistan’s institutional set up and especially the army in order to foment a bloodless coup geared towards bring about an Islamic Caliphate. Although Smith’s article provides little in terms of new understandings concerning HT’s ideology or its methodological recourse to the levers of power, it is the nature of the information provided in the article and its timing which raises the most important questions. Smith’s article for the first time identifies Imtiaz Malik as the key personality in Pakistan and departs from the conventional analysis of media representative Naveed Butt as being the central leadership. If so, then knowledge of Imtiaz Malik would have been known to British intelligence and to the media for some time considering their relationship with HT defector Maajid Nawaz whose counter extremist think tank, the Quilliam Foundation, has full financial and political backing from the UK foreign office. With Nawaz’s open endorsement of his relationship with the British government, it would be safe to assume that his cooperation fully extends to the intelligence services. Maajid Nawaaz was privy to the HT set up in Pakistan and HTB’s relationship with it having been a member its leadership committee in the UK and part of the team which travelled and emigrated to Pakistan in order to assist HT operations in the country. Smith’s assertion that; ‘HT is believed to have been set up in Pakistan in the early 1990s by Imtiaz Malik’ and that in ‘1999 a call was sent to British Hizb ut-Tahrir members to move to Pakistan’ which ‘prompted the movement of some of the UK’s “top quality” activists to south Asia’ clearly seems to have been sourced from Maajid Nawaz who is also quoted in the article claiming that the global leadership of HT had ignored Pakistan until it announced itself as a nuclear power. The crunch point however in Smith’s article was the revelation by an ‘insider’ that in 2003, four army officers were arrested in Pakistan on suspicion of being linked to extremist groups, although the groups and men have not been named. The ‘insider’ claims they were recruited by the organization’s “Pakistan team” whilst training at the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst (RMAS), UK. If this information is reliable then it seems to have been gleaned separately from Maajid Nawaz who had left Pakistan by this time and who allegedly was imprisoned by the Egyptian authorities during this period. Bearing in mind the hierarchical and cellular nature of HT’s organizational structure, knowledge of such a secretive team would only be known to its leadership in either Pakistan or the UK. The fact that the alleged arrests of the Pakistani army officers trained at RMAS have never been acknowledged nor publicized by the Pakistani authorities is also suggestive that the UK intelligence may have had a role in deliberately leaking this information through Smith’s article. This is reinforced by the timely nature of the article as it coincidentally follows a trip to Pakistan by Maajid Nawaz paid for by the UK foreign office and provided publicity through the government’s media bastion the BBC through its news programme, Newsnight in July, 2009. The question of HT Britain (HTB) being infiltrated by British intelligence has been suspected because of its open door policy towards recruitment in the UK and more poignantly attempts by the HTB leadership to break rank and to reach out to the British government exemplified by its acceptance of an invitation by UK member of Parliament, Claire Short to speak to other Parliamentarians at Westminster in 2007. The open door policy was also extended to journalists who were provided open access to members and to the internal operations of HTB. This suspicion has been further compounded by the continuous refusal by the British Labour party to ban the movement despite the application of aggressive pressure by the opposition Conservative party. What the cases of ex- HTB whistleblowers Shiraz Maher, Ed Hussein and Maajid Nawaz have clearly demonstrated is that British intelligence is likely to have been embedded within the movement for some time. The level of infiltration seems to have been within the senior echelons of HTBs’ leadership exemplified by the fact that it has been confident enough to risk these assets becoming public without fear of losing its influence internally. Therefore, inevitably it would have full knowledge of the British origin members who are alleged to have helped set up and run the HTB originated structure in Pakistan. Maajid Nawaaz’s open declaration of his close association and collaboration with the UK Foreign Office would mean that most if not all of the British Pakistani HTB members sent to Pakistan would have been known to the British intelligence services including Imtiaz Malik at least since 2005. The burning question is why the HT global leadership has not moved to quarantine its leadership in the UK and its members who travelled to Pakistan considering the obvious security risks posed to it.

Copyright Noman Hanif

Hizb-ut-Tahrir UK Uses European Court Appeal to Cover Rapproachment with Britain

On the 25th of June 2008, Hizb-ut-Tahrir UK or HTUK gave a press conference outlining their plan to submit an application to the European court with the express aim of overturning the German government's banning of the Party in 2003 on the basis of anti-semitic activity.Representing HTUK was Jamal Harwood (legal representative UK), Taji Mustafa (media representative UK) and Shakir Ahmed(media representative Germany). According to the press release, HTUK had recruited the services of Barristers Chambers and the team includes Keir Starmer QC (Doughty Street Chambers) Matthew Ryder, Keiron Beal (both of Matrix Chambers) and Tayab Ali (McCormacks Solicitors). The use of such legal methods, institutions and persons close to the British government is unprecedented in HT history.

It is my argument that the appeal by HTUK is a figleaf for a covert channel of engagement between HTUK spearheaded by Jamal Harwood and the British government through MATRIX chambers. Previous overt engagements have occurred between HTUK and the British political establishment through Claire Short with an invitation at Westminister.British intelligence has been successful in fully infiltrating HTUK with CIVITAS claiming that intelligence is "all over them". A glimpse of this infiltration was demonstrated through the efforts of Ed Hussein and his recruitment of Maajid Nawaz and Rashad Ali, both of whom were high level within the HTUK structure. They now run a British government inspired covertly funded foundation known as the Quilliam Foundation. Despite its claim to fight extremism in general there is no doubt that its specific agenda is Hizb ut Tahrir. Therefore British intelligence seems to have to been successful in playing both groups with the help of some interesting manouvres by the UK government through the threats of a ban. The ban has not materialised under Labour because the government was still in the process of monitoring and influencing not only the internal structure but all operations emanating from HTUK which were instrumental in establishing cells in Europe, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia and others. Majid Nawaz who was privy to much of this information and has publicly stated his direct role in Pakistan and Denmark would have been further debriefed by the intelligence services.
The response of HTUK has been to threaten legal action. Such action has no legitimacy according to its understanding of Islamic jurisprudence. It seems the move by the government was to provide the leadership of HTUK with the cover to engage the government. However, the ban never materialised under Labour but is likely under a predicted Conservative government. For this reason HTUK have undertaken the German concern in order to lay the foundations for the covert channels with the Conservative government before the ban comes into place.


According to the press release: "The HT legal team led by Keir Starmer QC has highlighted the following points in the submission:

1. The silencing of HT re expression of its views publicly in Germany despite it being well known that HT is a non violent political party based on Islam.

2. The refusal of the German Constitutional court to hear the German appeal of HT citing that HT is a foreign association despite the fact that many of its members are German nationals, its clear existence in Germany for several decades, and despite the fact that the lower German courts banned the activities of HT in Germany (banning the Party in one court and not recognising it in another).

3. The rejection of the appeal of 21 members of HT resident in Germany, some of which have been expelled from the country and had their assets confiscated or frozen and despite several being German or EU nationals.

4. Banning of activities due to the supposed non-agreement with the “idea of International understanding” a principle which is insufficiently articulated to be readily ascertained. Furthermore, to ban an organisation’s activities on this basis is wholly disproportionate.

I would like to highlight a few points on this appeal:

1.There was no effort by HTUK, its representatives at the press conference or by Jamal Harwood in his interview with Islam Channel to outline the Islamic legitimacy upon which this appeal is based. This is a crucual point because HT follow a fundamental understanding of Islamic jurisprudence which states "every action requires evidence(from Islamic sources)".

2. According to HT understanding as outlined in its books, it recognises no legal mechanism, principle or law which is derived from outside what it considers the legal sources of Islam which are the Koran, Traditions of Mohammed, Consensus of the companions of Mohammed and Qiyas or legal analogy. It henceforth follows the jurisprudential principle which states "that which agrees with Islam is Kufr(non-Islamic) and that which disagrees with Islam is kufr" ie whatever is derived jurisprudentially from outside of the sources of Islam are invalid and prohibited.

3. Henceforth, HT does not recognise the legitimacy of laws, systems, governments, constitutions which are not derived from Islam. This is further based on its understanding of the verses of the Koran which states "Whoever does not judge by whatever Allah (God) has revealed are fasiq(wrongdoers), zalimoon(evil doers), kafiroon(non-believers)

4. The approach to seek judgment from courts, authorities, governments where no Islamic legitimacy exists is prohibited. This is how it understands the verses of Koran which prohibit the approach to bodies and institutions whose basis of legislation is not from the sources of Islam. One of the verses of the Koran states, "Have you seen those who say they believe in the revelation, yet they turn for their disputes to the Taghout (interpreted by HT as a body/instituion legislated from outside of the Islamic sources).

5.On the above basis HT's founder Taqiudine -an-Nabhani applied for the registration of the Party in Jordan in 1952 under the existing Ottoman law of association. However, it was not an application for legitimacy but a declaration of the party and hence it did not seek any legal address because it considered the Jordanian government, consitution and system as illegal.

6. The points raised by the HTUK have been purely on the considered illegality under European Human Rights Convention relation to the freedom of expression and association both principles which HT attacks in its literature as well as the principle of Human Rights.

7. Jamal Harwood argued that the German ban was based upon its own governments admission on the fear of the spread of HT and its success amongst the youth in Germany. He argued that nowhere else in Europe was this ban on HT. Hence the aim according to Shakir Ahmed was to expose the contradictions of Western capitalism and its notions of freedoms and democracy. This is while both Jamal Harwood and Shakir Ahmed state that HT does not work to establish Islam i=outside of the Muslim world but looks to protect and lead muslim communities in the West only and does not politically engage with the government.

Here there is a contradiction. The challenge to ideology of the German government is by nature political action and an engagement because it relates to the manner in which the German government looks after the affaisr of its citizens which includes Muslims. The engagement of societies outside of the muslim world is outside of the remit of HT. In actuality even the idea of working to build Muslim communities outside of the Muslim world for a post Caliphate period is a violation of its jurisprudential understanding that the work to establish Islam "in the muslim" world and "the instituion of the Caliphate" is a vital life and death concern according to the understanding of HT that the companions of the Prophet Mohammed delayed the burial of the Prophet Mohammed until after the election of a Caliph despite the conflict with the Islamic rule that a Muslim must be buried immediately.

It is important to note that Taqiudine an Nabahani did not put any consideration or value to the presence of Muslims or members of HT living/ working or studying in the West throughout his leadership of the Party for 30 years.The concentration of collective action was solely related achieving power in the Arab world as a primary objective with the expansion of the party members and influence of societieslimited to the rest of the Muslim world.

8. HT declares Britain as the nation which harbours the greatest hatred towards Islam based on its history with Islamic power and its success in infiltrating, destabilising and ultimately bringing down the Ottoman Caliphate. Accordingly it also regards Britain as the most politically cunning of all the nations and the one best in intelligence. Hence according to its draft constitution it is considered an "enemy" state for Muslims. In practical terms there is to be no relationship, link, approach or any form of contact with the British political/intelligence establishment or its surrogates. Any such contact is considered "poison" for any Islamic movement.

Yet HTUK has coveted the British political establishment through Claire Short at Westminster and now through MATRIX chambers which is strongly embedded with the British political establishment having been used by intelligebce to provide a statement of illegality for the Iraqi invasion and the US/UK position in order to indirectly embarrass the US. It was no coincidence Cherie Booth, wife of Tony Blair is also part of this chamber and UK intelligence is fully co-opted on all high profile cases. This connection has been highlighted by the HTUK itself in its lierature on Iraq.

Manufacturing a Terrorism Case Against Hizb-ut-Tahrir

Taken for Noman Hanif's article "Ex-Islamist Inc: Fabricating a Link Between Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Terrorism"


Finding no hard conceptual or empirical evidence linking HT with violent activity, terrorism or even the methodology of jihadism, Husein then takes his argument to the illogical,

“As long as it remains legal for extremists in Britain to plan and finance Islamist attempts to mobilise the Muslim masses in the Middle East, and prepare an army for "jihad as foreign policy", there will always be a segment of this movement that will take jihad to its logical conclusion and act immediately, without leadership” (The Telegraph, 2nd May 2007)

As highlighted above even from the Sufi discourse, Jihad as an individual duty against occupation and aggression as well as the foreign policy of the state is well established in the books of classical Islam and leads directly to the Koran itself. Whether Husein agrees or is unwilling to accept the obvious is another issue. The reality is that the discourse with the relevant Koranic authority exists. The prohibition by HT of conducting violent action in order to achieve its political aims would put any of its members involved in such activity outside the fold of its organisation and method and hence they would cease to be a part of it as was the case of those members such as Omar Bakri which went onto form Muhajiroun. For this reason they can no longer be said to be acting in the name of HT. Thus HT was not responsible for Muhajiroun anymore than the Muslim Brotherhood was responsible for Sayid Qutub or the Syrian based Sufi movement (to which Ed Husein himself belongs) was responsible for the British bomber in Israel, Asif Haneef.

The suggestion that because HT expounds the duty of individual jihad in theatres of military conflict, segments will act without leadership is a dangerous logic to expound for any Muslim. If one was indeed to follow this line of argument to its consistent finale then the Koran itself is responsible for international terrorism because of the many verses related to fighting and killing in the realms of defence, a conclusion I am sure Ed Husein will not be rushing to advocate.

With no concrete evidence to frame HT, Hussein has turned to manipulating facts in order to comply with his Home Office set agenda. Two examples of such manipulation stand out in his book “The Islamist”. The first centres around the unsubstantiated allegations that HT was responsible for inciting the murder of a Nigerian student, Ayotunde Obunabi, in Newham College in the 90’s. ( The Islamist pp149-153).

Contrary to eye witness accounts he maintains that it was not about drugs and gangs rather it was about “Muslim supremacist tendencies”. Although he admits he did not get directly involved, he along with a colleague from HT raised the ante. This is a very serious allegation and one in which he has been overwhelmingly contradicted on many forums. On his website Husein asserts that the details of the events were agreed with colleague Maajid Nawaz prior to the release of his book;

“We agreed that the Hizb had created an atmosphere that led to the murder. More than anybody else, Maajid and I were closely involved with developments on campus during those months” (www.theislamist.tumblr.com)

However, the real reason for Hussain’s spin on the murder and his refusal to correct his innacuracy is firmly revealed when he connects it with the terrorism narrative;
“TThe Hizb must accept their part in radicalising young Muslims in Britain, starting with the murder in Newham to the carnage of 7/7 and the 2,000 cases that the secret services are monitoring now.”( www.theislamist.tumblr.com))

Again no direct connection was established. Moreover, Maajid Nawaz’s brother Kaashif Nawaz felt it necessary to intervene in order to correct Hussein’s assumption.

“The murder at East-Ham college was not of a man who was a Christian, but of a man who was high on drugs, and carrying 2 knives with intent on attacking one of the students on campus, he was intercepted by a gang of Muslims, who intercepted him - nothing to do with Islamism or HT, but more to do with gang wars which Muslims got involved in and some HT members tried to resolve.” (Comment on The Islamist: A Review by Kaashif Nawaz)

The second refers to the radicalisation of Tel Aviv bomber Asif Hanif, whom Husein following the assumptions of Shiv Malik in Prospect Magazine, claims had been recruited by HT in Britain but according to intelligence reports had been recruited in Syria but not by HT. On the contrary, it has been alleged by people who knew Hanif from Hounslow that he was not very fond of HT. Rather, whilst in Syria, Haneef who became acquainted with Husein had belonged to the same Sufi movement as him. There is again more than enough doubt to even suggest a link between Asif Hanif and HT. In contrast the evidence linking Hanif with Husein’s own Sufi movement is more pronounced. The case in point merely demonstrates the dubious evidence employed and the lengths to which Husein is willing to go in order to provide the elusive link.
Shiraz Maher similarly follows the flawed logic of Ed Hussein. In a programme for More4, Maher tries to make the incredible claim that the Tel Aviv bomber Omar Sharif had been influenced to commit the action, nine years after he suggested that Sharif had any association with HT. According to Maher;

“The whole mind frame of Omar Sharif [took] an ideological backbone from Hizb ut- Tahrir. His vision of an Islamic state, his anti-west sentiments, all that came from their conditioning…So if he how goes on nine years later to act out an act of violence, who is to blame?” (More4, 15th May 2006)

As with Hussein, having failed to convincingly manipulate the facts in this case that of Omar Sharif, Shiraz Maher maintained the Darwinian hope of one day finding the ‘missing’ link between link between HT and terrorism. According to More4 Shiraz’s sentiment at the time was;

“They are non-violent at present, but they are a threat waiting to materialise.” (15th May 2006)

If over fifty years of HT activity has not provided the proof then exactly what is Maher searching or more succinctly hoping for? It must be noted here that HTB on its website categorically denied as baseless allegations that Asif Hanif or Omar Sharif had any association with HT. Uptil now no proof has been provided for this relationship, a fact that both Husein and Maher seem deliberately to ignore.
Maher and Husein did not have to wait too long for their next opportunity. The failed bombings at London and Glasgow airport in July, 2007 provided the perfect occasion for their endeavour. Maher was co-opted heavily by the print and television media. The reason for this was his claim that whilst a student at Cambridge he had befriended one of the doctors, Dr.Bilal Abdullah, responsible for attempting to ram a jeep into Glasgow airport and now being held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The script could not have been more perfect for Maher and Husein. The media and Home Office machinery went into action. Supposedly, they had found the missing link between HT and terrorism. Maher was interviewed on BBC Newsnight for three nights in row and then published his account in the New Statesman. The framing of HT by insinuation was not difficult to decipher. For Maher it was the best self marketing opportunity for his credentials as an ex-Islamist that had occurred since he offered his services as an ex-Islamist Inc. Tom Nuttall, deputy editor of Prospect Magazine which had interviewed Maher and Husein stated that they were finding it hard to cope with the interest generated in these guys. Ignoring the fact that Dr. Abdullah had been of a jihadi persuasion before Maher met him and by Maher’s own admission on BBC Newsnight that Dr.Abdullah had rejected HT’s approach to join the organisation because he disagreed with the non-violent or political methodology of HT. Despite this, the main focus of Maher in his interviews and articles remains the pursuit of fabricating HT’s ‘inevitable association’ with terrorism. Maher writes;

“And so it was through my involvement with Hizb ut-Tahrir and its ideology of extremist political Islam that I came to befriend Bilal, the would-be bomber. That's why I believe it's wrong to distinguish between "extremism" and "violent extremism" as the government has been doing in recent months. The two are inextricably intertwined. Without movements such as Hizb creating t he moral imperatives to justify terror, people like Bilal wouldn't have the support of an ideological infrastructure cheering them on. And, I believe, it's a fallacy to suggest that the culpability of agitators and cheerleaders is any l ess than for
those who actually carry out acts of terror.” (New Statesman, 5th July, 2007)

The British government and the security services having sat back and let the media frenzy run riot in creating a hostile Islamophobic environment of distrust towards Muslim doctors and professionals, Ed Husein re-entered the fray. Ed ‘Einstein’ had just come up with a ground breaking theory. The case of the Glasgow doctors had empirically demonstrated that Islamic movements whose membership and leadership consists of medical and technical personnel has the propensity towards terrorism. Amazingly but not surprisingly Husain was allowed an audience for this schizophrenia through the US publication Newsweek. According to Husein’s theory;

“They (engineers) approach the Qu'ran as though it were an engineering manual, with instructions for right and wrong conduct. Literalism and ignorance dominates their readings. This flaw is deepened by the haughty mindset of the engineer or medical doctor that academic achievement, a place at a university, now qualifies him to approach ancient scripture without the guidance of the ulama. To the Islamist engineer, centuries of context, nuance, history, grammar, lexicon, scholarship, and tradition are all l ost and redundant. The do-it-yourself (DIY) attitude to religious texts, fostered by doctors and engineers of secular colleges, produces desperate, angry suicide bombers devoid of spiritual guidance” (Bin Laden’s Army, Newsweek, 10th of July, 2007)

Of course Bin Laden the “engineer” and Zwahiri the “doctor” were predictable case studies in this theory of guilt by professionalism. However, this was merely the starters. The main menu was of course HT. Lo and behold, HT had failed to install a fool proof screening system which detected doctors and engineers. Hence logically they were bound to produce angry terrorists and suicide bombers! Ridiculously humorous as it may sound, this is exactly what Husein argued;

“The rank-and-file of Islamist organizations, the precursors to terrorism, are filled with activists with a technical education. The instructor of my first secret cell in Hizb ut- Tahrir in London was a town planner; my second cell-leader was a medical doctor. Even today, medical doctors manage the British arm of Hizb ut-Tahrir-a global Islamist political party working for the re-establishment of an Islamic caliphate: doctors Nasim Ghani, Abdul Wahid, and Nazreen Nawaz. Globally, the central leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir is a Jordan-based engineer, Abu Rishta. The story of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is similar. When Islamists graduate to jihadist terrorism the profile is equally chilling.” ((Bin Laden’s Army, Newsweek, 10th of July, 2007)

By logical deduction one would presume that in Husein’s own professed Sufi circles there exists either no doctors or engineers or access is denied to them because they have the propensity of DIY literalism and terrorism. Whatever one may think, Ed husein seems to have convinced himself that he had finally found the “missing link”. The detective had at long last found the proof linking Dr. David Bannister with the incredible Hulk. Before one could pronounce Dr. Abdullah, Ed Husein had gone global with his theory.

On a serious note, as the media set about globalising Maher’s association with Dr. Abdullah whilst being a HT member, Husein followed Maher up by using his “professional association” theory to push for a ban on HT in Australia which led the Attorney General to reconsider the Australian position. According to ABC Australia;

“Hizb ut-Tahrir members are alleged to have associated with one of the men arrested over the failed London bombing….Last night on Lateline, a British defector from the group warned Australian members of Hizb ut Tahrir are Muslim extremists and take direction from London.” (ABC 6th July, 2007)

Again, the fingerprints of the UK Home Office were apparent. The co-operation and strategy between Britain and Australia towards HT’s proscription is a long standing one and has generally followed the same trajectory. Again both Maher and Husein were mere pawns in the ongoing strategy which does not look to proscribe HT but merely apply the threat of proscription in order to moderate and ultimately control it. Hence despite his best efforts to link Dr. Abdullah with HT and ultimately with terrorism, like in Britain, Husein met with the same response during his interview and debates. According to Jacob Townsend, research analyst with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and co-author of a paper on the Hizb ut-Tahrir presence in Australia.

“The biggest risk from Hizb ut-Tahrir is if, and I say 'if', it acts as a conveyor belt for extremism, moving people from radicalisation and towards violence ideologies. There is only suggestive evidence, not conclusive evidence that around the world Hizb ut-Tahrir itself has ever been implicated in violence. So, we have to be careful in the sense that on the basis of evidence, 'no', Hizb ut-Tahrir does not authorise or organise violence”. ( ABC Australia, 6th July, 2007)
Having failed in his linkage with Dr.Abdullah, Husein thought he’d try his luck with the “Dr Bannister” theory;

“On a final thought, even here, the leadership of Hizb ut Tahrir as well as the leadership of Mohabist organisations are filled with engineers and doctors.” ( ABC Australia, 6th July, 2007)

In conclusion it seems evident that both Ed Husein and Shiraz Maher have found an extremely receptive audience in the Home Office and the media. The Home Office needed pawns for a specific strategy on HT and the war on terror, whilst Ed Husein and Shiraz Maher needed an opportunity to market their credentials as ex- Islamist insiders with the goal of establishing themselves as authorities on radical Islam and terrorism in general and more specifically HT. However, their reductiveness and obsession in a theoretically and empirically bankrupt mission to link HT with international terrorism seriously puts into question the very nature of their personalities and agendas. The manner in which they have attempted to prove their logic has oscillated from the ridiculous to the comical.

In doing so, they have disconnected themselves with the actuality of a narrative, which puts Western foreign policy and neo-colonialism towards the Islamic world as the prime cause of radicalisation, not only in the West but in the Islamic world. It is quite astonishing that while the majority of the Muslim’s and even non-Muslims vent their frustration and anger over the Anglo-American neo-colonial occupation in Afghanistan and Iraq both Husein and Maher remain silent on the issue. Moreover, the atomised fixation with proscribing HT with the overtly tacit support from the UK government and media machinery frames them within narrative of Western complicity in radicalism and terrorism. In this regards Maher is far off the mark when he suggests that;

“There is no quick fix to the problem of home-grown terrorism, but banning Hizb ut- Tahrir would be an excellent first step, sending a strong signal to aspiring terrorists that Britain has not changed the rules of the game. We no longer play that game.” (The Telegraph May 2nd, 2007)

No doubt Husein and Maher are in need of a reality check. The rules remain as does the game. In essence they remain averse to the actual logic of their argument of guilt by association which taken to its rightful conclusion would connect 9/11, 7/7 etc not with the Islamic movement but with the creation and fostering of jihadism by the Western security services to meet US and British policy objectives in Afghanistan during the 80’s and Bosnia during the 90’s. Bin Laden and Zwahiri were not the creation of HT but of the CIA., Taliban was hot the creation of HT but of the ISI and the CIA, Al-Muhajiroun was not the creation of HT but of Omar Bakri supported by MI5. The use and protection of Omar Bakri, Abu Hamza, Mohammed Aswat, Abu Qatada and Hassan Butt is not by HT but by the British security services. The narrative which puts terrorism specifically in the context of a blowback resulting from the Western use of jihadism has nothing to do with HT.(Please refer to the works of Nafeez Ahmed on the War on Truth )

The unfortunate reality is that the politics between the UK Home Office and HTB is locked in until at least one of the parties decides to change the rules. Until then Maher and Husein will most probably continue to justify their co-option by the UK government and media by maintaining a politics of fear through perpetual efforts at fabricating a link with terrorism along with the doomsday scenario of a Caliphate. As the quotes below clearly demonstrate, behind the actors garb operate British neo-cons disguised as ex-Islamist Inc.

“We can wait for their state to come about and then confront them as we did the Nazis, at a very late stage and at a high human cost, or we can stop appeasing Hizb ut- Tahrir and its offshoots and demand: either change, or perish. We cannot continue to turn a blind eye.” (Ed Hussein, Chilling Similarities, Commentisfree, Guardian, 10th July, 2007)

Copyright © Noman Hanif 2007

The Methodology of Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Violent Action

Taken from Noman Hanif's article "Ex Islamist Inc: Fabricating a Link between Hizb ut Tahrir and Terrorism"

The Islamic world is a melting pot of various movements committed to Islamic revival. However, the Islamic movement is not a unitary block. The commonality of its final goal masks the trenches which exist between the movements related to the understanding of the political reality and the methodology required to bring about the final solution. The politics of Islamism is fundamentally contested. These contestations are evident not only in the literature base of these movements but also in the practical application of their strategies. In order to correctly evaluate any movement there has to be an objective reading of its ideational base and an empirical appreciation of its methodology and strategy in practice. At the same time a cautionary principle must be adopted in that the study of movements is not a scientific one. One cannot confine the movements to the realm of a laboratory and hypothesize. In the real world the Islamic movement is a live cosmopolitan shopping mall. People tend to move in, out and around different movements, picking up a host of ideas on the shopping trip. For instance in the public circles and Friday sermons organised by the various movements, the audience will consist of a plethora of interested parties affiliated to different persuasions and organisations. The attendance of a person from one school of thought in the activity of another does not in any way imply a wholesale conversion. Such an argument would indeed be nonsensical and a twisted distortion of everyday human behaviour in the life of all societies. Yet it is with this twisted logic that the war on terrorism is evolving and more succinctly the logic of Zeyno Baran, Ed Hussein and Shiraz Maher against Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

The basis of this deviant logic has nothing to do with international terrorism. Baran’s agenda is a fresh application for the ‘politics of fear’. This is a Raeganite ‘war of ideas’ paradigm which was applied successfully against Communism and now blasts against political Islam. The Hudson Institute, The Nixon Center and other US prominent think tanks were indeed established on the very premise of fighting a war of ideas against Communism and the Soviet Union. In this paradigm, radical Islam is substituted for Communism as the primary “evil”. Baran’s agenda for this war against HT under this ill defined model becomes suspiciously apparent not only in the Nixon Center’s and the Heritage Foundation’s superficial and deliberate mis-reading of the HT ideology and politics but in the collusion with anti-HT, non-democratic but energy resourceful states and governments in Central Asia.

Ed Hussein and Shiraz Maher however are not in the same league as Baran. Whereas Baran is an engine for US policy, Husein and Maher are simple pawns that seem to have prostituted themselves in the Western led battle against political Islam. In my article “The Future of HT in Britain”, I situated Ed Huseins book ‘The Islamist’ and his heavy promotion as an insider as part of a British strategy towards bringing HT into mainstream politics domestically and utlitising it for foreign policy goals externally. In my follow up article “David Cameron and Labour’s Strategy towards HT”, I have identified four areas of this strategy which is not to proscribe but to maintain the threat of proscription in order to moderate and engineer HT’s British branch such that it can be utilised for policy purposes. One of the elements of this strategy is to maintain the possibility of a fabricated link between terrorism and HT through employing ex HT members such as Ed Hussein, Shiraz Maher and in smaller measure ex-Muhajiroun member Hassan Butt. The heavy engagement by the UK Home Office, security services and the media of these ex-members has not gone unnoticed. The comments on the various websites where their articles have been published indicate a trust deficit by Muslims and non-Muslims alike regarding the agenda’s of these characters largely brought about by the contradictions, inconsistencies and inaccuracies in their accounts and testimonies. Moreover as I will demonstrate the conceptual positions of both Husein and Maher in framing a false case of terrorism against HT are untenable and as argued above seem to be motivated by factors other than a desire to address the real causes of terrorism.

Before I embark upon a refutation of Hussain and Maher’s edifice which attempts to link HT with terrorism, it is essential to understand exactly what HT ideology is towards violent action. HT’s theoretical premise for its methodology is openly detailed in its books. It claims to strictly follow the stages of the Prophet Mohammed in his political journey from the Arabian city of Mecca to the establishment of the Islamic state in the Arabian city of Medina. This journey according to all the books of HT was a non-violent one involving the building of a popular base through dawa(interaction) and then the installment of an Islamic government built on the support of the popular base and the intervention of the people of influence and power. Because this methodology has been considered a derivative from the Islamic sources through a process of ijtihad (jurisitic exertion), it is considered a divine obligation and deviation from it haram(prohibited). HT’s strict adherence to this methodology is a widely understood reality. Moreover, HT has been the thorn of jihadists in condemning their use of violence as a methodological tool. In their exchange with the jihadists’ which can be gauged from various websites, HT members argument rests on the argument that the disciples of Mohammed who were subjected to varying degrees of torture in Mecca wanted to respond with violence but were strictly prohibited in doing so by the Prophet Mohammed.

The concept of violence does not occur in the realm of methodology but in the realms of jihad, a word and a concept which has been a long standing thorn in the history of Western experience with Islam. Jihad which has many definitions indeed has a violent application. However, according to HT ideology this is confined to the realms of self-defence and the last resort in the ideological expansion of the state. In this sense apart from the styles used and the basis of motivation, one would find it difficult to distinguish this conception from the practice of ideological states in the international arena. Western neo-colonialism and the application of democracy by force in Iraq being a prime example. HT rejects jihad (physical struggle) as a means and method to bring societal and state transformation. However, it judges the response of violence in the form of Jihad as legitimate in the case of aggression against and occupation of Islamic territory such as Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq. In these cases the response of resistance to Western occupation and policy is not novel to the Islamic movements, it has a broad measure of support amongst the Muslim masses.

The crunch issue here is that even despite the acceptance of the duty of individual jihad (fard ayn), HT maintains that the fundamental solution remains the resumption of Islam and the establishment of the Caliphate. For this reason it does not initiate jihadist activity as a movement. According to Suha Taji Farouki,

“Hizb ut-Tahrir has been calling with mounting intensity for the eradication of Israel by jihad since the early 1980s’, but this means calling for action by the Muslim states, the Muslim masses and the armies of Muslim countries, and not the party itself organizing the jihad – in fact, it calls on them to re- establish the caliphate so that jihad can be launched.” (‘Islamists and the threat of Jihad: Hizb al-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun on Israel and the Jews’.In Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4, October 2000, pp. 21– 46)

It is the concept of Jihad upon which Ed Husain builds his accusation of terrorism against Hizb ut Tahrir. In an article entitled, “I know how these terrorists are inspired”, Husein claims that HT’s proclamations of jihad is what laid the groundwork for terrorism in the UK;

“The rhetoric of jihad introduced by Hizb ut-Tahrir in my days was the preamble to 7/7 and several other attempted attacks.” (The Telegraph, 2nd May 2007)
The problem is that the rhetoric he was referring to was indeed true, but it was under the aberrant leadership of Muhajiroun head Omar Bakri Mohammed. After removing Omar Bakri, HTB reverted initially to its original understanding of Jihad outlined above and subsequently distanced itself from any such rhetoric by removing all references to Jihad even on its website. This fact has been acknowledged by Husain. Moreover, HTB has gone out of its way to list and detail on its hizb.org.uk website, the opinions of prominent Western ambassadors and analysts familiar with HT in different parts of the world such as Craig Murray, former British ambassador to Uzbekistan, who have confirmed the adherence of HT to its non-violent methodology despite the extreme levels of torture and repression against its members. Expressions of violence against the Israeli state and the Western forces in Iraq, Afghanistan etc are not restricted to HT but resound widely in the Islamic world as a mobilising concept against occupation only. Again as Nuh Keller’s points above clearly illustrate, jihad is an established concept in Sufi discourse even relating to the offence by an Islamic state and ideological supremacy. By attacking the concept Husein puts himself against the vast majority of recognised Islamic scholarship, yet again proving that Sufism is merely a mask.

Shiraz Maher: Ed Husein's Supporting Actor

Taken from Noman Hanif's article "Ex-Islamist Inc: Fabricating a Link between Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Terrorism'

The case of Shiraz Maher is an interesting one. Unlike Husein, Maher was a prolific writer for Hizb ut Tahrir in Britain (HTB) demonstrating a sound understanding of HT ideology. Hence his dramatic u-turn in 2005 from doctrinal Islamist to secularist must have taken HTB completely by surprise. Maher first came to prominence as “reformed” ex-HT Islamist through his publication of an article in Prospect Magazine wherein he argued that UK Universities had failed to acknowledge the extent of Islamic extremism on the campuses despite the report by Anthony Glees and Chris Pope, "When Students Turn to Terror" (Social Affairs Unit). Since then he has been working in the background as a consultant for the BBC on political Islam and although preceded Ed Hussein as the original ex-HT defector was overshadowed by the publication of The Islamist, until now. However, Maher’s own opportunism starts with the issue of his Maher’s official account of when exactly he joined HT which has been disputed by people who claim to have known him. Within a comment on Maher’s article in the New Statesman entitled, “Glasgow bombs: the Doctor I knew”, the person under the name of Sajid writes;

“Brother Shiraz why are you dishonest over the one matter you should know best. I note that in this article you have tried to avoid the lies in your previous accounts of your "recruitment". You have now admitted that when you moved to Leeds you "already knew about Hizb ut-Tahrir". However that is not what you wrote in the Times Higher Education Supplement [3 February 2006] when you said that you first met HT at Leeds University where you were "recruited". Did we not attend HT study circles in Birmingham Central Mosque together for several years when you were at Solihull School and I was at King Edward's? You had first approached members of HT many years previously when you lived with your grandfather in Harborne in 1994. I remember that you asked to join HT at that time, but rather than ‘recruit’ you , HT merely explained its thoughts to you, and did not make any efforts to meet you again. Many years later you again actively approached members of the party at a mosque in Leeds. In the article last year in THES you alleged that you had been approached at university - I am glad that you have now admitted in this article that your previous account was inaccurate. With so much dishonesty why should anyone now believe your account?” (New Statesman, 12th July, 2007)

Why was there a need for Maher to provide such contradictory accounts. Is it an attempt to cover tracks in order to reinvent oneself? Or is it more sinister? Whatever the answer, the issue of credibility has already been raised.
The attempted bombing of Glasgow airport catapulted Maher directly into the global media limelight. The British media had brought him in from the cold. Why? Not because he knew the Glasgow bomber Dr. Abdullah, but because he knew him in the capacity of a Hizb-ut-Tahrir member. Ed Hussein’s Home Office script had just found a supporting actor. Maher took the opportunity and locked himself into the narrative. Until now Maher had made no connection between HT ideology and terrorism. Rather the focus was on protecting liberal values through attacking HT’s goal of an Islamic Caliphate and the supremacy of Sharia;

"Hizb ut-Tahrir is, after all, ostensibly non-violent and committed to open discussion, so can it really be that dangerous? I suggest that it is…Hizb ut- Tahrir is no paper tiger. It is a revolutionary movement seeking to overthrow governments in the Muslim world, establish a caliphate and then wage jihad on other nations." [Times Higher Education Supplement]
Crucially however, the opportunism is confirmed by the fact that he had kept quiet about his association with jihadists in the past and had argued vigorously as a HT member that its methodology was non-violent and no link had ever been established between HT and terrorism. Whilst a member of HT Maher states;

“Disillusioned at the failure of her agents to suppress the Islamic da'wah we now see the colonialist states taking direct action against the Hizb. Despite vain attempts to slander the Hizb and associate her name with terrorism the German government much like the Uzbek, Jordanian, Syrian, Egyptian administrations has failed to show demonstrate any such link. Islam is the only ideological solution to capitalist exploitation and hegemony. Unfortunately even the supposedly democratic west - the bastion of liberal democracy and free speech - now fears this growing and unstoppable call."[http://64.233.183.104/search?q=cache:ezY- FZ8NFHkJ:www.paklinks.com/gs/archive/index.php/t- 86574.html+%22shiraz+maher%22+ban&hl=en&gl=uk&ct=cln k&cd=22]

It is not surprising that Maher has vigorously tried to remove these statements from the internet. The question which naturally arises from the quote is that despite HT’s ideology remaining consistent for over fifty years, no terrorism connection was ever found. HT’s ideology has not changed so what has? Maher as with Ed Hussein provides no answers to this question. Moreover, since according to his own admission Dr. Abdullah had been radicalised by jihadism before his introduction and also according to his own admission Abdullah had rejected the non-violent methodology of HT and refused to join HT, Maher is totally disingenuous in declaring that the ideology of Islamic dissent and HT ideology in particular is a precursor to terrorism.

“And so it was through my involvement with Hizb ut-Tahrir and its ideology of extremist political Islam that I came to befriend Bilal, the would-be bomber. That's why I believe it's wrong to distinguish between "extremism" and "violent extremism" as the government has been doing in recent months. The two are inextricably intertwined. Without movements such as Hizb creating t he moral imperatives to justify terror, people like Bilal wouldn't have the support of an ideological infrastructure cheering them on. And, I believe, it's a fallacy to suggest that the culpability of agitators and cheerleaders is any less than for those who actually carry out acts of t error.” (New Statesman, 5th July, 2007)
Yet the closeness to the narrative of The Islamist is unmistakable,

“Islamist terrorism does not exist in a vacuum. Like other social phenomena, it operates within a wider infrastructure, designed to achieve specific ends. In this case, that is the political ideology of Islamism, an idea distinct and different from Islam the religion. ” (New Statesman, 12th July, 2007)

“The political ideology of Islamism”, “Islam the religion”. Sound familiar? Once the fog is removed it is clearly recognisable that Maher has been scripted by the Home Office to play supporting actor to Husein. The issue is not terrorism but a concerted attack on the ideas of political Islam and specifically those concerning the Caliphate, Islamic Universalism and jihad. Thus it is no coincidence that Maher ‘s timing of his article in The New Statesman on the 12th of July coincided with Husein’s articles in Newsweek and the Guardian in the same week, concurring that;

“Islamist groups thrive on preaching a separatist message of Islamic supremacy, which concerns itself with reversing the temporal decline of Islam and challenging the ascendancy of the west by reviving a puritanical caliphate.” ((New Statesman, 12th July, 2007)